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SECURITY INFORMATION

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USAF Declass/Release Instructions On File

TAB "A"

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D/I USAF PROPOSED CHANGES TO NIE-64 (Part I) EXTENDED TO MID-1954 (All references are to the published NIE)

1. Ref. page 2, para 10. Suggest this paragraph be deleted because intelligence cannot support the projection of a Communist capability, or lack of capability, to overthrow any non-Communist government during the period to mid-1954. (Subsequent paragraphs to be renumbered in accordance with this deletion.)
2. Ref. page 4, para 24. Change to read: We estimate that the Bloc armed forces by mid-1954 ³ will probably have:

* * * *

- b. An authorized strength of about 26,700 over-25,000 aircraft, including about 13,000 ^{40,250} jet fighters, 1250 ³ medium piston bombers, and possibly a few jet medium bombers. (Footnote to remain as is)
3. Ref. page 4, para 28, last sentence: Revise to read: We estimate that by mid-1954 1953 there will not be a considerable increase in the numerical strength of the air defense forces ~~will not change~~, although the effectiveness of the air defenses will improve through re-equipment and training.
4. Ref. page 5, para 36: Revise to read: Since the beginning of the Korean war, the Communist Air Force in China, which is believed to be made up of Chinese Communist, North Korean, and Soviet elements, has been built to an impressive size. The jet fighter units in the Korea-Manchuria-North China area are believed to be progressively improving. With the introduction by

mid-1954 of an estimated 160 jet light bombardment aircraft, the offensive determined that

CIA has no objection to declass

It contains information of CIA interest that must remain

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It contains nothing of CIA interest

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capabilities of this air force will increase. However, the capabilities of the GAF . . . in Korea and adjacent waters. We believe the CAF in China will continue to expand gradually during the period of this estimate but will remain entirely dependent upon the USSR for aircraft and equipment, spare parts, and technical supervision, and almost entirely dependent upon the USSR for aviation fuels and lubricants. Unless some type . . . extremely limited. Redeployment from the Manchuria . . . against Pakistan and Southeast Asia.

5. Ref. page 6, para 47: Suggest revising to read: We believe that Bloc political warfare capabilities in the Middle East and Africa will remain comparatively low throughout the period of this estimate, except in Iran. In Africa, it may be expected that Communist political efforts will be proportionately increased in those regions where native unrest constitutes a continuing problem for Western security - Union of South Africa, Tunisia, French Morocco and Kenya. The Bloc has taken little positive action thus far in these three areas, and most of the existing Communist Parties have been forced underground. However, continued deterioration of the Western position would increase the vulnerability of the area to Bloc political warfare.
6. Ref. page 7, para 49, third sentence. Suggest revising to read: We believe that there is very little likelihood that the Indian Communists can make sufficient progress within the period of this estimate seriously to contest the dominant position of the Congress Party.
7. Ref. page 7, para 50, last sentence. Revise to read: However, at present, the Party lacks the capability for seizing control of the government during

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the period of this estimate, and almost certainly will be is unable significantly to impair Japanese cooperation with the West. If US military and economic support for Japan is lessened, the capability of the Japanese Communist Party to seize control of the government will be correspondingly enhanced during the period of this estimate.

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